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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Richard M. Caldwell appeals from the denial of his Rule 35 motion for 
reconsideration of the sentences imposed upon multiple counts of lewd conduct 
with a child and sexual abuse of a minor. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Caldwell, with a wife in Utah, carried on a three year extra-marital affair 
with Virginia Reed in Idaho. (PSI, p. 7.) During that time he repeatedly sexually 
touched Reed's daughter, starting when she was about 11; he and Reed sexually 
touched the daughter together; and Caldwell and Reed gave the daughter and 
two of her young friends alcohol and then engaged them in manual-genital 
touching and oral sex on more than one occasion. (PSI, pp. 2-3, 18-25, 56-57. 1) 
A grand jury indicted Caldwell on three counts of lewd conduct with a child 
and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor for multiple sexual acts or solicitations 
with the three child victims, aged 12 to 14. (R., pp. 9-14.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Caldwell pied guilty to two counts of lewd conduct. (R., pp. 82-91.) 
He later, however, was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp. 110-11, 129-
30.) Caldwell proceeded to trial where he was convicted of two counts of lewd 
conduct with a child and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor. (R., pp. 191-93.) 
The district court imposed seven concurrent sentences of twenty years with three 
1 Page numbers of attachments to the PSI are referenced sequentially to the 
numbered pages of the PSI. 
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years fixed. (R., pp. 228-35.) Caldwell did not appeal from entry of judgment. 
(See generally R.) 
Seventy-seven days after entry of judgment Caldwell filed a Motion for 
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35. (R., pp. 255-65.) Caldwell also 
requested appointment of counsel to pursue his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 269-
71.) The district court denied both motions without a hearing. (R., pp. 286-89.) 
Caldwell filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his Rule 35 motion and 
motion for appointment of counsel. (R., pp. 303-08.) 
On July 15, 2011, Caldwell moved to augment the record with a previously 
unrequested transcript of the trial in this case, a previously prepared transcript of 
the grand jury proceedings in this case, and several documents (the PSI, PSE, 
APSI, and sentencing transcript) from Reed's criminal case. (Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) None of these documents and 
transcripts had been presented to the district court in this case. (See generally 
R.) Although the Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion to augment in relation 
to the grand jury transcript, it denied the motion in all other respects. (Order 
Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (8/25/11).) 
2 
ISSUES 
Caldwell states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Caldwell due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
the record with various transcripts and exhibits, which were 
relied on by the district court at sentencing and in its 
disposition of his I.C.R. motion? 
2. Did the district court err when it determined that Mr. 
Caldwell's request for counsel in regard to his Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 motion was frivolous? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in 
light of the financial and emotional hardships caused by his 
sentence and the negative impact his sentence is having on 
his mental health? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Caldwell failed to show that transcripts and exhibits never submitted 
to or considered by the district court in relation to Caldwell's Rule 35 
motion are necessary to create a record on appeal that is sufficient for 
adequate appellate review of the denial of that motion? 
2. Has Caldwell failed to show error in the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35 
motion and request for appointment of counsel because the district court 





Caldwell's Claim That Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Items Was A Due Process Or Equal Protection Violation Is 
Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Caldwell's motion to augment with the 
(as of yet unprepared) jury trial transcript from this case and exhibits, including a 
transcript, from a different case. Caldwell contends that, because he is indigent,2 
he is entitled to whatever record he wants unless "the state [proves his] request 
is entirely frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Caldwell is wrong in his statement 
of the legal standard. Due process and equal protection require the state only to 
provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors alleged. Because 
none of the denied transcripts or documents are relevant to, much less 
necessary for, appellate review of the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35 motion (the 
only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), Caldwell has failed to show any 
error in the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Caldwell's motion to augment. 
2 The record in this case indicates that Caldwell earned $50,000 to $80,000 as a 
contractor for years prior to his incarceration. (PSI, pp. 9-10.) He was 
represented by retained counsel throughout the trial court proceedings 
(excepting his Rule 35 motion, from which counsel withdrew). (R., pp. 40, 42, 48, 
91, 106-07, 112-13, 125, 138, 197, 237, 282-85.) Caldwell's affidavit claiming 
indigence is a form, and claims he has no funds or assets. (R., p. 270.) In his 
motion to waive costs he lists $15,600 in assets, and a potential asset of $85,000 
in the form of a lawsuit. (R., pp. 276-77.) He also lists several thousand dollars 
in expenses that may apply to his family but certainly do not apply to him. (R., 
pp. 277-78.) His last tax refund, received about three months before he made 
his application, was $5,000. (R., p. 278.) Because the district court did not rule 
on whether Caldwell is in fact indigent (R., pp. 286-89), this issue would remain 
to be decided if necessary upon remand. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such 
as claimed due process violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements 
have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 
380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 
P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Caldwell Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 
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229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 
(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To 
show prejudice Caldwell "must present something more than gross speculation 
that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 
605 (6th Cir. 2002). 
This case is indistinguishable from State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 
P.3d 472 (2002). In that case the Idaho Supreme Court stated the relevant legal 
standards and concluded that the transcript of a hearing on a Rule 35 motion in 
which there were no witnesses called was not necessary to conduct an adequate 
appellate review. 19..,. at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. "When a motion to reduce 
sentence is supported solely by documentary evidence and no hearing is held, 
the denial of that motion can be adequately reviewed on appeal based on the 
evidence in the record." 1sl at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Here the appellate record is adequate because, as in Strand, it contains 
all of the evidence submitted in support of the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 255-65.) 
Because there was no timely appeal from the original judgment, this Court lacks 
appellate jurisdiction over the originally imposed sentence and will confine its 
review to whether new evidence presented in support of the Rule 35 motion 
demonstrated the sentence to be excessive. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007) ("Rule 35 does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.") Because none of the items requested augmented by Caldwell were 
before the district court in deciding the Rule 35 motion, they are not germane and 
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are instead unnecessary for appellate review under the rationale and holding of 
Strand. 
Caldwell ignores Strand. (Appellant's brief, pp. iv-vi.) Instead, citing 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), he claims if he makes a 
"colorable argument" that he needs an "item" to complete a record the burden 
transfers to the state to show the "item" is unnecessary. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
He further argues, with no citation whatsoever, that to deny him any requested 
transcript or other augmentation "the state must prove [his] request is entirely 
frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) No reading of Mayer supports these legal 
arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. kl at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. kl at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
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where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be 
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." !fl at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." !fl 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. !fl at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. !fl at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the proceeding challenged on appeal is the denial of Caldwell's Rule 
35 motion. The record related to the denial of the Rule 35 motion is already 
complete because all the evidence considered by the district court is before the 
appellate court. Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. It is Caldwell's 
appellate burden of establishing that the requested transcripts and other 
documents related to different trial court proceedings are necessary to create an 
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adequate appellate record to review the denial of his Rule 35 motion. The 
augmentations he sought, however, were of different proceedings: a trial (the 
verdict and resulting judgment of which are beyond the appellate jurisdiction of 
this Court), and exhibits from and a transcript of a sentencing in an entirely 
different case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the trial transcript or the 
exhibits from the different case were before the district court in relation to the 
Rule 35 motion. Having failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable 
need of the trial transcript or exhibits and transcript from a different case, there is 
no burden on the state. 
None of the requested augmentations are necessary for appellate review 
of the denial of Caldwell's Rule 35 motion because none of the items Caldwell 
seeks to augment were actually before the district court in relation to the Rule 35 
motion. All of the evidence before the district court in relation to the Rule 35 
motion is currently before the appellate court. (R., pp. 255-65.) Because all of 
the evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is 
adequate for appellate review. Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. In 
rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is 
"limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence 
that was never before the trial court." State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 
859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 
80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain 
new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). Because the trial transcript 
and the Reed exhibits and transcript were never presented to the district court in 
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relation to the Rule 35 motion, they were never part of the record before the 
district court in considering the Rule 35 motion and are not properly considered 
for the first time on appeal. 
Caldwell asserts that because the district court stated at his sentencing 
that Caldwell's circumstances and culpability were different than co-defendant 
Reed's, the PSI, PSE, APSI and transcript from Reed's case must be necessary 
for appellate review of his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) He 
further speculates that because the district court found at sentencing that 
Caldwell's trial testimony was untrue and manipulative that the trial transcript will 
assist him on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) The flaw in this argument is 
that Caldwell could have challenged the district court's sentencing findings by 
appealing from the judgment or by raising these claims in his Rule 35 motion, but 
he did not. (R., pp. 255-65.) It was his burden to present, in conjunction with his 
Rule 35 motion, evidence showing such error in the sentencing. See Huffman, 
144 Idaho at 203, 159 P .3d at 840 (where appellant does not appeal from 
judgment he must present evidence in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion 
showing an abuse of discretion). Caldwell is effectively asking this Court to admit 
and consider new evidence so that he can, for the first time on appeal, challenge 
factual findings of the district court that he did not challenge in his Rule 35 motion 
and which were made in relation to a judgment that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
review. Caldwell's argument that the Constitution entitles him to such 
augmentation is without merit. 
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Caldwell is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the denial 
of his Rule 35 motion. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that such a record is 
adequate when it contains all the evidence presented in support of the motion. 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78. Caldwell does not address the 
applicable Idaho authority and his arguments are unsupported by the authority he 
does cite. Caldwell has failed to show that the denied augmentations are 
relevant to appellate review, much less that they are necessary for adequate 
appellate review. 
II. 
Caldwell Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion 
And Request For Appointment Of Counsel Because The District Court Correctly 
Decided That The Motion For Reconsideration Of The Sentence Was Frivolous 
A. Introduction 
Caldwell filed a motion for reduction of sentence asserting his family was 
"having a very difficult time emotionally and financially" while he was incarcerated 
and that he wanted to get programming for his alcohol abuse outside of prison. 
(R., pp. 256-62.) He supported his petition with a letter from his wife. (R., p. 
264.) The district court denied the motion and the request for counsel after it 
determined this was not "new material of any consequence" because it had been 
addressed at sentencing and therefore the motion was frivolous. (R., pp. 287-
88.) Caldwell contends that the information he provided was new, and his motion 
not frivolous, because the district court did not have before it at sentencing 
evidence of exactly how his confinement ultimately affected his family or his 
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rehabilitation prospects. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.) Caldwell's argument is 
without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the 
court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims 
presented are frivolous." Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing appointment of counsel in post-
conviction proceedings). 
C. Because Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous, The District Court Did 
Not Err By Denying The Motion Or The Request For Counsel 
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the 
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Murray v. State, 121 
Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the trial 
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at 
his or her own expense. I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). A determination of whether a 
motion for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-
852(b)(3) is based on the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying 
documentation that may support the motion. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525, 
873 P.2d 167, 270 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a district court is within its discretion to 
deny a request for court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b )(3) if it 
appropriately finds, after reviewing the contents of the motion, that the claims 
presented are frivolous. Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16. 
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To prevail on ~iis motion, Caldwell had the burden of "show[ing] that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." Huffman, 144 
Idaho at 202, 159 P.3d at 839. Review of the record shows that Caldwell did not 
meet this burden, both because the information was not new and because, even 
if new, it failed to show that the sentences were anything other than lenient. 
The district court engaged in careful weighing of all the relevant facts and 
factors at sentencing. (Tr., p. 52, L. 15-p. 69, L. 21.) The nature of the crimes 
Caldwell committed was horrible and pervasive, involving sexual activities with 
three victims barely teenaged or younger, often plying them with alcohol. (PSI, 
pp. 2-3, 18-25, 56-57.) All things considered, ordering seven concurrent 
sentences that allow for parole in three years (R, pp. 232-34) was extremely 
lenient. The district court rightly found that a motion to reduce the sentences 
based on the claims that Caldwell (1) was no longer providing an income to his 
family due to his incarceration and (2) believed that he would rehabilitate faster 
outside of prison was not a motion a reasonable person would pursue with his 
own funds. (R., p. 287.) 
Caldwell claims that the information he provided is new in the sense that it 
was impossible to know at the time of sentencing exactly how his incarceration 
would affect his family and mental health and what programming he would get at 
the prison. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.) As found by the district court, the 
information is not new because the district court was aware at sentencing of the 
likely effects of Caldwell's incarceration. (R., pp. 287-88.) Even if the information 
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could be considered "new," Caldwell makes no argument how this "new" 
information makes this the sort of motion that a reasonable person would pay his 
own money to pursue. 
The motion had no chance of success. It contained no truly new 
information because it can come as no surprise to anyone that incarceration 
makes financially supporting a family more difficult or that defendants might be 
dissatisfied with the conditions of confinement. Even if the information was "new" 
in the sense that the exact details of the effects of incarceration became known, 
such is an unpersuasive reason to reduce already lenient sentences under the 
facts of this case. Caldwell has failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of augmentation and the trial court's denial of the motion for 
counsel and the motion for leniency. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 2012. 
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